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Abstract 
This study was an attempt to analyze the factors influencing the loan repayment performance of group borrowers.  
Primary data was collected from sample respondents (selected by using simple random sampling technique) 
through questionnaire. From the total 87 questionnaires distributed, 83 that are 95% (response rate) were 
collected. The study has applied explanatory type of research. Chi-square test statistics was employed to test the 
association of each explanatory variable with group loan repayment performance (dependent variable). 15 
explanatory variables were considered in the Chi-square test. Out of which seven variables (loan purpose, group 
members know the monthly sales of the group members, group members’ regularly visits other group members, 
group members’ help, group members knew the other group members before the group was formed, group 
members put pressure on other members to repay, and penalty) were found to have statistically significant 
association with loan repayment performance.  Thus, to improve the group loan repayment performance, DECSI 
should consider those statistically significant explanatory variables and take corrective actions accordingly.  
Keywords: Chi-square, DECSI, Ethiopia, Factors, Group Loan, Mekelle, MFIs, MSEs. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In many developing economies majority of the people live in great poverty. Lack of having access to external 
finance is one of the reasons why many people in developing economies remain stuck in poverty. Usually, the 
poor have no access to loans from the formal banking system because the poor in general cannot meet the 
collateral requirements stipulated by the banks and the inherently high cost to banks to assess the risk type of 
potential borrowers (screening), to ensure that the loan, once made, is utilized productively (monitoring) and to 
ensure the repayment of loans if borrowers are unwilling to do so (enforcement) may all contribute to the 
exclusion of the poor from the credit market.  Recently, however, the poor in both rural and urban areas of these 
economies have succeeded in gaining increased access to loans. An important contribution to make this possible 
is made by so-called group lending programs (Al-Azzam & Sudipta, 2007).  
Joint liability group lending was the original model of Grameen Bank, and it is one that some micro 
financing organizations still offer (Gine & Kalran, 2008). During the past few years group lending programs 
have been introduced in many developing economies (Hermes, Lensink, & Mehrteab, 2005). 
Under joint liability group lending, borrowers come together to take out individual loans for which 
they are jointly responsible. In group lending, if one member cannot meet his or her repayment obligation, other 
members must bear the repayment of the defaulter otherwise all borrowers in the group will be responsible and 
denied future access to loans from the program. Therefore, group lending mechanism creates incentives for 
individual group members to screen out risky borrowers, monitor each other’s’ actions and enforce repayment 
(Al-Azzam, Hill, & Sarangi, 2008). Joint liability group lending mechanism tackles three major problems which 
affect the repayment performance of the self-help groups (SHGs) problem of adverse selection, i.e., to ascertain 
what kind of a risk the potential borrower is (Charlotte & Lodewijk, 2003). Problem of moral hazards, i.e., it 
makes sure of proper utilization of loan so that a borrower is in a position to repay within the due date, and 
problem of enforcement, i.e., pressure mechanism is operative on willful defaulters (Verhelle & Berlage, 2003). 
Micro finance Institutions (MFIs) have two major lending methodologies; group and individual 
lending. Group lending involves lending to a group of borrowers who are jointly liable for a loan. However, 
individual lending often requires collateral that the poor borrower can pledge; the value of the collateral and the 
loan size may not be closely related. A common characteristic of group lending is that the group obtains a loan 
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under joint liability, so each member is made responsible for repayment of loans of his or her peers (Huppi & 
Feder, 1990). There are also two modalities of group lending. One , a lender may provide funds to a group or a 
collective entity such as a cooperative or a village bank which then disburses the loan to individual members 
according to agreed criteria. In such a case, the group is jointly liable for the entire amount of the loan. Second, 
funds may be lend to members individually who are organized in groups , in which case the group jointly 
guarantees all loans or simply provides information  about individual participants (Huppi & Feder, 1990).  
The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) supervises MFIs in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government has laid 
down a regulatory framework for the establishment of MFIs by issuing proclamation No. 40/1996 that provides 
for the licensing and supervision of MFIs. Since the issuance of this proclamation in July 1996, today, there are 
31 MFIs registered with the National Bank of Ethiopia serving clients (Ebisa, Getachew, & Fikadu, 2013). 
Dedebit Credit and Savings Institution (DECSI) is one of those micro finance institutions (MFIs) in Ethiopia, 
which is inaugurated in Tigray region. By considering the criteria that the poor were denied by conventional 
banks, i.e., the difficulty to secure traditional collateral, DECSI designed group (groups of 3-7 members) based 
loans by taking lessons from the Grameen Bank.  
MIFs such as DECSI are facing financial constraints to sustain loan provision to the poor due to 
problems in loan repayment performance. Thus, this study was conducted to examine the factors that determine 
the performance of group loan repayment of DECSI, Mekelle - Tigray.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Micro finance refers to the provision of financial services to low-income clients, including consumers and the 
self-employed (Ledgerwood, 2000). The word microfinance refers to small-scale financial services primary 
credit and savings provided to people who operate small enterprises, provide services, fish farm or herd, and to 
other individuals or groups at local level of developing countries both rural and urban areas (Robinson, 2001).  
Degene (2001) also described microfinance based on its main characteristics: its directing of the poor, 
promoting small business, building capacity of the poor, extending small loans without collaterals, combining 
credit with savings, and charging commercial interest rates. 
Generally the term microfinance refers to the provision of financial services to low-income clients; 
however some microfinance organizations also provide insurance and payments. In addition to financial 
intermediation, many microfinance institutions provide social intermediation services such as group formation, 
development of self-confidence, and training in financial knowledge and management capabilities among 
members of a group. Furthermore, microfinance is not simply banking; it is a development tool as well and as 
such, its activities also involve provision of small loans, typically for working capital; informal evaluation of 
borrowers and their investments; collateral substitute, such as group collateral or compulsory savings, secured 
savings products (Ledgerwood, 1999). 
Based on the above concept of micro financing, it is clear that the primary objective of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) is to provide financial (credit and saving) and non-financial social intermediation services 
(such as group formation, development of self-confidence, training in financial knowledge, and management 
capabilities among members of a group) to the poor in order to release financial constraints and help alleviate 
poverty.  
Group lending is an innovation that makes it possible, where the poor borrowers act as guaranties each 
other by the joint liability. While exploiting the local knowledge that has members on each other, group lending 
solved several problems of asymmetry of information between borrowers and creditors (Bassem, 2008). 
Since 1970s, group lending programs have been promoted in many developing countries (Zeller, 
1996).In group lending programs screening, monitoring and enforcing repayments problems are solved by 
providing loans to an individual borrower, who is a member of a borrowing group. The group of borrowers is 
made responsible for the repayment of the loan: all group members are jointly liable. Non-repayment by the 
group also means that all borrowers in the group will be denied future access to loans from the program.  
The principle of joint-liability creates an incentive mechanism in which each group member has an 
interest in screening and monitoring the other members, and to enforce repayment if necessary, since the non-
repayment of one of the other members will be costly for her/him and, additionally, may cut off access to loans 
in the future. Thus, individual borrowers are stimulated to select credible members to group with, to monitor the 
other members’ activities once the loan is received, and to enforce repayment in case a group member fails to 
pay her/his obligations (Ghatak, 1999). 
In this case, joint liability lending microfinance institutions can lessen the three major problems facing 
formal credit institutions in lending to the poor. These problems are: (a) to ascertain what kind of a risk the 
potential borrower is (the problem of adverse selection), (b) to make sure she/he will utilize the loan once made, 
properly, so that she/he will be able to repay it (the problem of moral hazard) and (c) to find methods to force the 
borrower to repay the loan if she/he is reluctant to do so (the enforcement problem). By utilizing the information 
advantages of members belonging to the same community and their potential to exert pressure on borrowers, 
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borrowing groups under a joint-liability contract are in a better position than formal banking institutions to 
address these problems (Ghatak, 1999). 
Joint-liability, therefore, reduces the costs of screening, monitoring and enforcement of repayments for 
the creditor. Several theoretical papers have shown the positive contribution of joint-liability programs to 
reducing screening, monitoring and enforcement costs. Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990) have presented models 
in which peer monitoring within groups reduces moral hazard behavior of individual group members. Group 
lending programs delegate costly monitoring activities to group members, reducing the costs of lending, which 
may be translated into lower interest rates the borrowers’ have to pay and/or larger loan contracts. 
Regarding to the group loan repayment performance, several studies have been conducted in many 
countries by different authors. Thus, the following sections present the empirical studies and their findings with 
respect to the relationship between repayment and screening, monitoring and enforcement activities within 
groups, and on factors of individual/borrower characteristics.  
 
2.1. REVIEW OF THE RELATED EMPIRICAL LITERATURE IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
Wenner (1995) studied on the determinants of repayment of groups. He used data of 25 groups from Foundation 
for International Community Assistance (FINCA), a group-based program in Costa Rica. His analysis indicated 
that repayment performance of groups improve when groups have written (formal) rules stating how members 
should behave. This variable indirectly measures screening, monitoring and enforcement activities that take 
place within the groups. The variable location indicated that if groups are located in remote areas this reduces 
their possibilities to have access to alternative sources of credit, which stimulates them to ensure group 
repayment as much as possible in order to have future access to loans.  
Matin (1997) examined repayment performance of Grameen Bank borrowers: The Unzipped State.  By 
using data of 246 borrowers from Grameen Bank, he verified the effect of education, landholding, length of 
membership in years, other source of loans on delinquency. He has found that education and landholding have 
negative effect on delinquency; whereas length of membership and other credit sources have positive effect on 
delinquency. 
Matin (1998), by using data of 246 borrowers from the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh, also found that 
members who have other credit sources and who have land use above some threshold level have a higher 
probability of showing repayment problems. These outcomes may indicate that since these borrowers have other 
credit opportunities or that they have accumulated substantial assets, they have less interest having future access 
to loans from the program, which may reduce their screening, monitoring and enforcement activities. This result 
confirms to the results of Wenner (1995) and Sharma and Zeller (1997) that is if borrowers are more credit 
rationed and if groups are located in remote areas, these reduces their possibilities to have access to alternative 
sources of credit, which stimulates them to ensure group repayment as much as possible in order to have future 
access to loans. 
Sharma and Zeller (1997) used data of 128 groups from four group-based lending programs in 
Bangladesh to study the determinants of repayment. They used a number of variables that may measure 
screening, monitoring and enforcement activities within groups. They found that repayment problems increase 
when there are more relatives in the same group. This supports the theory that when people know each other 
very well and have close social ties, they may be less eager to pressure for repayment (Conning, 2000; Wydick, 
1999).  
Zeller (1998) has analyzed the repayment performance of six group-based lending programs in 
Madagascar based on detailed information from 146 groups. He examined measures of social ties between group 
members and found that groups with stronger ties show higher repayment rates. This supports the assumption 
that group members with stronger ties have more information about each other and are, therefore, better able to 
screen, monitor and enforce.  
However, this finding is against the findings of Conning (2000), Wydick (1999) and Sharma and Zeller 
(1997) that is repayment problem increase when there are close social ties and more relatives in the same groups, 
respectively. Furthermore, he found that groups with internal rules and regulations prove better repayment rates; 
this finding is conformed to the finding reported by Wenner (1995).  
According to Wydick (1999), who used data of 137 groups from Foundation for the Integrated 
Development of Socioeconomic Programmers (FUNDAP), a group-based lending program in Guatemala. He 
used lists of variables measuring screening, monitoring and enforcement within groups. He found that the 
average distance between group members negatively influences repayment performance. Monitoring becomes 
more difficult if the distance between members increases, whereas the knowledge one member has of the weekly 
sales of other members is positively related to repayment performance.  
Godquin (2002) has tested the explanatory power of social ties, group homogeneity, social 
intermediation, dynamic incentives and loan characteristics (loan size and loan duration) on group’s repayment 
performance. He used 1629 loan observations of borrowers from the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh Rural 
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Advancement Committee (BRAC), and Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB) from Bangladesh. Two 
repayment measures were used: repayment on time with a grace period of three months was used in the whole 
sample and repayment on time was used in the split sample (one regression by MFI). He found that the effect of 
social ties within group members on repayment is negative. Group homogeneity in terms of sex showed a 
positive impact whereas homogeneity in terms of education showed a negative effect on repayment performance. 
Social intermediation (non-financial services) on repayment performance like access to basic literacy had a 
negative impact on the repayment of the Grameen borrowers while access to health services proved to have a 
positive impact on repayment performance. Dynamic incentives have positive impact of on the repayment 
behavior of the borrowers as credit rationing has a positive significant impact on the repayment performance. 
The size of the loan portfolio showed significant negative impact on repayment performance; this could be 
explained by a fall in the manager's time allocated to each group as the loan portfolio increases. The number of 
weeks the borrower had to wait before receiving his loan had no significant impact on repayment performance. 
Habteab, Lensink, and Hermes (2004) conducted a study on determinants of repayment performance of 
group-based lending program evidence from Eritrea.  By using sample of 102 self-help group (SHG) members, 
they have analyzed whether peer monitoring and social ties mitigate the incidence of repayment problems among 
group members in two group-based lending programs operating in Eritrea. Their results showed that the 
variables measuring regular group members’ peer monitoring and social ties are found to be statistically 
insignificant. At the same time, theoretical models on group-based lending emphasized the point that peer 
screening, monitoring and enforcement activities taking place in groups is performed by all group members. The 
findings in the case of the Eritrean programs provided results that are in contrast with the existing theoretical 
models on group-based lending. 
Matta (2004) have examined the determinants of group loan repayment in Dominica Republic by using 
data of 135 members selected randomly from four branches. He tested the effect of group size, information 
symmetry, social ties, peer pressure, and group solidarity on group loan repayment performance and he has 
found that loan repayment was increased by smaller group size, peer pressure and group solidarity, and groups 
composed of family members. 
Hermes et al. (2005) examined adverse selection and moral hazard in group-based lending evidence 
from Eritrea. They have investigated whether peer monitoring and social ties reduce the occurrence of moral 
hazard in the setting of two group-based lending programs in Eritrea. Their results indicated that regular contact 
and a short physical distance between the group leader and the other members helps to reduce misuse of loans by 
individual group members. Moreover, if the group leader knows the other group members before the group is 
formed and if he has never changed groups, this reduces the probability of moral hazard within the group.  
According to Kono (2006), group lending is a good enforcement scheme for achieving high repayment 
rates as evidenced from framed field experiments in Vietnam. They conducted field experiments in Vietnam to 
capture the role of joint liability, monitoring, cross-reporting, social sanctions, communication and group 
formation in borrowers repayment behavior. They found that joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding 
problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment rates. 
Al-Azzam and Sarangi (2007) analyzed repayment performance in group lending, evidence from 
Jordan.  They used data from a survey of 160 borrowing groups of the micro fund for women in Jordan. They 
tested the effect of screening, peer monitoring, group pressure, and social ties on borrowing groups’ repayment 
behavior. The study found that delinquency is reduced by screening, peer monitoring, group pressure, and social 
ties. 
Christian and Robert (2007) carried a study by using repayment dada to test across models of joint 
liability lending. They used survey data from 262 joint liability groups of the Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) and from 2880 households of the same villages. Their study reported that 
repayment is affected negatively by the joint liability rate and social ties, and positively by the strength of local 
sanctions and correlated returns. 
Bassem (2008) investigated the determinants of successful group loan repayment in Tunisia. He 
analyzed the internal and external delinquency of a self-designed survey of 286 groups of credit. The results of 
the estimation showed that repayment is influenced positively by internal rule of conduct, same business, 
knowledge of other members of the group before formation, peer pressure, self-selection, sex, education, and 
non-financial services. However, the homogeneity, and the marital status are among the main factors acting 
negatively on the repayment. He also concluded that the tie with the loan officer positively affects the repayment 
performance of credit groups. 
Groups that were formed using a self-selection process show a better repayment performance. Finally, 
the results indicated that if borrowers are more credit rationed, this increases repayment performance. This result 
can be taken as evidence for the fact that group members have more incentives to screen, monitor and enforce if 
they have no alternative credit sources (Sharma & Zeller, 1997).  
Feroze, Chauhan, Malhotra, and Kadian (2011) have made a study on factors influencing group 
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repayment performance in Haryana. By using data of 120 groups from the state of Haryana, they found that peer 
monitoring, group size, and female percentage have positive influence, whereas homogeneity and loan amount 
have negative influence on the repayment performance of the groups. 
Kangogo, Lagat, and Ithinji (2013) have researched the influence of social capital dimensions on 
household participation in micro-credit groups and loan repayment performance in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. 
Based on a sample of 174 households, their results on group loan repayment performance revealed that 
experience in group borrowing, number of visits by loan officer, peer pressure, meeting attendance index and 
heterogeneity index positively and significantly influenced loan repayment performance while gender, household 
size, distance to the nearest financial institution and density of membership were significant but negatively 
influenced household loan repayment performance.  
From the above empirical review, most of the studies in countries other than Ethiopia reported that 
screening, monitoring and enforcement activities among group members significantly and positively influence 
the loan repayment performance of groups. However, one study reported that regular group members’ peer 
monitoring and social ties are found to have statistically insignificant effect on group loan repayment 
performance. 
 
2.2. REVIEW OF THE RELATED EMPIRICAL LITERATURE IN ETHIOPIA 
Abreham (2002) has researched loan repayment and its determinants in small scale enterprises financing in 
Ethiopia: a case of private borrowers around Zeway area. Sample of 102 clients were randomly selected. He 
showed that loan diversion is found to be one of the major determinants adversely affecting the loan recovery 
rate; borrowers who have other alternative income source were found to show better loan repayment record; 
business experience in related economic activity and education were found to be significant and positive while 
repayment period and sex were negatively associated with loan repayment rate; borrowers who have extensive 
experience in related activity and educated ones show better repayment record while male borrowers and 
projects with long repayment period show poor repayment record; and borrowers who involved in agricultural 
sector were found to be relatively defaulters as compared with other sectors.  
Jemal (2003) did his study on microfinance and loan repayment performance: a case study of the 
Oromia credit and savings share company (OCSSCO) in Kuyu. Using sample size of 203, his results revealed 
that loan diversion was found to be one of the important and significant factors influencing loan repayment 
performance negatively, i.e., it increases default risk significantly; suitability of repayment period was found to 
reduce the probability of diverting loan to nonproductive uses that ultimately lead to reduced recovery rate; loan 
size was found to undermine the repayment performance; and  factors like income, value of livestock, 
availability of other sources of credit and being female were found to enhance the probability of repayment. 
Micha'el (2006) has done a study on micro-finance repayment problems in the informal sector in Addis 
Ababa. A sample size of 225 clients was randomly selected. His result indicated that better repayment 
performance is strongly and directly associated with educational level of the borrower; insufficiency of the loan 
granted and unplanned engagements in the business activity do also reduce repayment performance; and 
government owned and not-for-profit non-government microfinance institutions were found out to face relatively 
larger non-repayment due to credit attitude of borrowers towards the loan, as if it were grant, instead of a liability 
at the time of difficulty. 
Fikirte (2011) under took a study on determinants of loan repayment performance: a case study in the 
Addis Credit and Saving Institution, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  Based on a sample of 200 randomly selected clients, 
she analyzed the socio-economic factors that influence loan repayment. A total of twelve explanatory variables 
were included in the regression. Out of these, six variables were found to be significant for the probability of 
being defaulter. Age and five business types (baltina and petty market, kiosk and shop, services providing, 
weaving and tailoring, and urban agriculture), sex, and business experience of the respondents were found to be 
significant determinants of loan repayment performance. 
Tnsue (2011) has analyzed determinants of loan repayment in microfinance institution: the case of 
DECSI QUIHA sub branch. A cross-sectional data were collected from randomly selected 140 (87.7% response 
rate) sample borrowers and key informant interview was held in the study area. His analysis showed that age, 
educational status, full disbursement of loan requested by borrowers, supervisory visit, and income from the loan 
activities financed by DECSI were significant factors that enhance the probability of loan repayment, while 
violation of loan agreement, distance of the borrowers dwelling from the lending agency, sex, occupation and 
number of dependents with borrowers were found to significantly increase loan default. 
Based on the above review, it can be concluded that most of the empirical studies done in other 
countries (other than Ethiopia) reported that screening, monitoring, and enforcement activities among group 
members improves the repayment performance of groups. Whereas, most of the empirical studies made in 
Ethiopia focus on factors of individual/borrower characteristics.  
Accordingly, education, income, loan supervision, suitability of repayment period, business experience 
Journal of Poverty, Investment and Development                                                                                                                             www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2422-846X     An International Peer-reviewed Journal 
Vol.10, 2015 
 
27 
GROUP 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 Peer Monitoring 
 Peer Pressure 
 Peer Screening 
 Peer Support 
 Social Ties 
INSTITUTIONAL 
 FACTOR 
 Loan Officers Visit 
ECONOMIC  
FACTOR 
 Other Source 
of Credit 
PERSONAL  
CHARACTERIST
ICS 
 Sex 
GROUP LOAN 
REPAYMENT 
PERFORMAN
CE 
in related economic activity, and age have significant and positively determine the loan repayment performance. 
However, unplanned engagements in the business activity, loan diversion, loan amount, and number of 
dependents with borrowers have significantly and negatively determine the loan repayment performance. 
Moreover, the number of weeks the borrower had to wait before receiving loan and the variables measuring 
regular group members’ peer monitoring and social ties were found insignificant in terms of loan repayment 
performance. 
 
2.3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Figure 1.Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Al-Azzam and Sudipta (2007), Kangogo et al. (2013), and Mawire (2012). 
Figure 1 above presents a conceptual framework of the relationship between the group loan repayment 
performance (dependent variable) and the factors influencing group loan repayment performance (independent 
variables).  
 
3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Table 1 and Table 2 below present the preliminary data collected that shows the repayment performance for 
consecutive five years (2009-2013) of DECSI, Mekelle for two sub-branches. 
Table 1: Summary of Loan Repayment Performance in DECSI South Sub Branch  
Year Loan Disbursed Loan Collected  Loan Defaulted Default Rate in % 
2009 8,484,070.89 6,675,315.23 1,808,755.66 21 
2010 9,663,664.59 7,098,997.91 2,564,666.68 27 
2011 4,219,778.03 2,000,589.68 2,219,188.35 53 
2012 3,872,388.63 1,253,000.00 2,619,388.63 68 
2013 4,623,862.25 2,006,184.54 2,617,677.71 57 
Source: DECSI (2014) 
Table 1 above illustrates group borrowers of South Sub Branch DECSI repayment performance. The 
default rate has been increasing for the subsequent four years, i.e., 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 with default rate 
of 21%, 27%, 53%, and 68%, respectively and 57% for year 2013.  
Table 2: Summary of Loan Repayment Performance in DECSI North Sub Branch  
Year Loan Disbursed Loan Collected  Loan Defaulted Default Rate in % 
2009 7,831,517.26 6,499,473.21 1,332,044.05 17 
2010 7,283,394.87 5,840,361.11 1,443,033.76 20 
2011 3,384,093.09 1,788,464.24 1,595,628.85 47 
2012 3,024,245.33 1,284,316.08 1,739,929.25 58 
2013 2,981,135.80 1,292,927.55 1,688,208.25 57 
Source: DECSI (2014) 
Table 2 above shows group borrowers of North Sub Branch DECSI‘s loan repayment performance. 
The default rate is increasing for the subsequent four years, i.e., 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 with default rate of 
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17%, 20%, 47%, and 58%, respectively and 57% for the last 2013 year.  
Based on the above Table 1 and Table 2, the two sub branches of DECSI group loan repayment 
performance is decreasing form time to time that can badly affect its financial sustainability of DECSI 
microfinance institution. This leads to increase in the overall annual default rate that is higher than the rate that 
the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) set for all financial institutions, i.e., <5 percent (or >95 percent expected to 
be collected). 
According to Samuel (2012), a series of defaults could lead to liquidity problem in the MFIs and 
would consequently limit the ability of the MFIs to extend credit/loan to other applicants. Thus, based on the 
above default problem existed on DECSI, it is worthy to conduct empirical investigation on factors influencing 
group loan repayment performance in order to examine what factors influence group repayment performance for 
DECSI so that the findings can be used to employ its credit programs for the better by considering the impact of 
a number of different variables which concerns group repayment performance such as group characteristics, 
personal characteristics, institutional factors and  economic factors.  
 
4. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objective of the study was to analyze the association of the determinant factors with the group loan 
repayment performance of Dedebit Credit and Savings Institution (DECSI), Mekelle - Tigray.  
 
5. MATERIALS AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section presents description of the study area and an outline on how the research was carried out, that is the 
data type and source, sampling design, data collection instruments, data processing and analysis techniques.  
 
5.1. DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA 
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) is administratively divided into nine national regional 
states and two administrative councils. The Tigray National Regional State (TNRS) is one of the nine National 
Regional States. The city of Mekelle was established in the 1870s, and selected as Ethiopia’s capital by Emperor 
Yohannes. Previously, it had been the site of several small settlements. The city’s strategic location in a large 
valley in the Ethiopian highlands placed it at the crossroads of the ancient salt trade in the Afar region to the east, 
and within easy access of the Red Sea, 200 km to the northeast (Cannon, 2009). 
Mekelle is the sixth largest city in Ethiopia and the capital of Tigray State. It is located approximately 
780 km from the capital, Addis Ababa, in the Ethiopian highlands. Mekelle city enjoys a mild highland climate 
with an average temperature of 25°C. The rainy season in Mekelle city is from June to September, while the dry 
season is from October to May. The average annual rainfall is approximately 579mm (KPMG International, 
2010). 
According to the 2007 census, the population of Mekelle was 215,546 of which 51.3 were Women. 
The 2013 census population, assuming a 5.4 percent growth rated, is projected to reach around 300, 000.The city 
also has an airport, the Alula Aba Nega international Airport, which offers several daily flights to Addis Ababa 
and other locations in Ethiopia. It also has cargo cold-storage facilities that should be very useful for perishable 
export cargo (Millennium Cities Initiative [MCI], 2011). 
The study was carried out in the city of Mekelle, five sub-cities in the two sub branches of urban group 
borrowers of Dedebit Credit and Savings Institution (DECSI): Ayder, Semien, Hadnet, Adi-Haqi and Kedamay 
Weyane.  
 
5.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section deals with research approach, data type and source, sampling design, data collection instruments, 
and data processing and analysis techniques. 
5.2.1. RESEARCH APPROACH 
For a similar study, Abreham (2002), Fikirte (2011), Habteab et al. (2004), and Kangogo et al. (2013) have 
applied explanatory approach; and Mawire (2012), Micha'el (2006), Tnsue (2011), and Zelalem, Hassen, and 
Jema (2013) have applied both descriptive and explanatory research approach. Therefore, this study has applied 
an explanatory approach for the quantitative data collected through questionnaire.  
5.2.2. SAMPLING DESIGN  
According to a similar empirical studies, Abreham (2002) and Tnsue (2011) adopted simple random sampling; 
Michael (2006) two-stage cluster simple random sampling; Fikirte (2011) a stratified sampling technique; and 
Habteab et al. (2004) a multi-stage sampling method. 
This study was conducted in DECSI, Mekelle, Tigray region. A two-stage sampling procedure was 
adopted for the study. The first stage was the selection of sample sub cities of the two sub branches of DECSI. 
Two sub cities from branch 1(Semien) and three sub cities from branch 2 (Debub) were selected. The second 
stage was the selection of sample respondents from the selected sub cities. Finally, a sample size of 87groups 
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(i.e., 49 female and 38 male group borrowers) proportional to the group numbers in each sub cities, were 
randomly selected from the list of clients that was provided by Mekelle sub–branch office of DECSI. 
A simple random sample (SRS) of borrowing groups was produced by a scheme which ensures that 
each sub cities have an equal probability of being chosen as the sample for the desired sample size of 87.  
There were 680 (i.e., 388 female and 292 male group borrowers) borrowing groups in DECSI, Mekelle. 
Two sub branches provide regular (group) loan to the five sub cities of the city of Mekelle. The total sample size 
of borrowing groups was 87 out of 680 borrowing groups (population) based on the following formula. 
In order to get adequate and representative sample of respondents, the sample size was determined by 
using the formula of Yemane (1967). The reason for using this sampling method was that the sizes of the 
borrowing groups are known. Among the several method of sample size determinations to determine the 
required sample size is at 90% confidence level and level of Precision = +10%,this means that , if a 90% 
confidence level is selected , 90 out of 100 samples have the true population value within the range of +10%, 
precision (sampling error). 
 
Where, n = sample size; N = population size (targeted population) = 680 groups; e = sampling error/level of 
precision = 10%.  Based on the above formula, the total sample size of borrowing groups was 87 (Table 3).  
Table 3: Determination of Sample Size 
(a) 
Sub 
Branch 
(b) 
Sub Cities 
(c) 
Number of 
Groups 
(Population) 
(d) 
Female 
(e) 
Male 
(f) 
(d*87)/680 
(g) 
(e*87)/680 
(h) =  f+g 
(Total 
Sample Size) 
North Ayder 113 64 49 8 6 14 
Semien 183 105 78 14 10 24 
South Hadnet 101 58 43 7 6 13 
Ad-Haki 54 31 23 4 3 7 
K/ Weyane 229 130 99 16 13 29 
Total 680 388 292 49 38 87 
Source: DECSI (2014). 
In summary, the study was made by using simple random sampling because it is considered the 
simplest, most convenient and bias free selection method. It enables every member of the population to have an 
equal and independent chance of being selected proportionately as respondents. The study considered 12.8% (i.e., 
87/680*100%) sample size of the target population chosen from each of the group whereby the target population 
was divided into sub cities. This ensured that all the sub cities within the study area were included in the study. 
5.2.3. DATA TYPE AND SOURCE 
For a similar study Abreham (2002), Habteab et al. (2004), and Mawire (2012) have used both primary and 
secondary data, and cross sectional type; and Micha’el (2006) and Jemal (2003) have used primary data and 
cross sectional type. 
Therefore, this study has collected primary data comprising quantitative data. The quantitative data was collected 
through questionnaire from group borrowers of DECSI. 
5.2.4. DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS  
As per a similar study, Nathan and Alfred (2009) have employed semi structured questionnaire; Kangogo et al. 
(2013) structured questionnaire; and Tnsue (2011) a structured questionnaire and unstructured interview. 
The aim of this research was to examine the association of the group loan repayment with the factors 
influencing the loan repayment performance in the DECSI, Mekelle. Thus, in order to answer the research 
questions, primary data was collected through questionnaire. The questionnaire written in English was translated 
to the local language, Tigrigna, for convenience to the respondents. The questionnaire was also pre-tested to 
evaluate for consistency, clarity, avoiding duplication, and to estimate the time requirement during data 
collection. On the basis of these comments, the questionnaire was further modified.  
Accordingly, questions were asked about group characteristics (i.e., the existence of peer-monitoring, 
peer- pressure, peer screening, peer support, social ties); personal characteristics (i.e., sex of borrowers); 
economic factor (i.e., availability of other source of credit); and institutional factor (i.e., loan officer visits). The 
primary data collection was carried out between April 2014 - May 2014. From the total 87 questionnaires 
distributed, only 83 that is 95% (response rate) were collected.  
5.2.5. DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
For a similar study, Jemal (2003) has applied descriptive statistics, T-test and Chi-square test statistics and probit 
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model; and Kangogo et al. (2013), Habteab et al. (2004), Fikirte (2011), and Bassem (2008) have applied a logit 
model. 
In this study, chi-square test was applied. Accordingly, the collected data was edited, coded, classified and 
tabulated after carefully checked for completeness and consistency in order to make them ready for analysis by 
using STATA. This was followed by analysis and interpretation of findings. 
 
6. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This section presents, analyzes and interprets the responses gathered from the respondents through structured 
questionnaire. For this purpose, the chi-square statistics was employed to compare non-defaulter and defaulter 
groups with respect to their variables in order to analyze the association of group loan repayment with the 
explanatory variables. 
 
6.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE RESPONDENTS  
The group sex and group representative’s personal characteristics are presented with particular reference to 
education and age in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Characteristics of Sample Respondents 
 
Source: Own Computation (2014) 
According to the Table 4 above; 
 The sample was composed of both male and female group borrowers. Of the total sample, 35(42.17%) 
were male groups and 48(57.83%) were female groups. 
 Of the total sample of the group borrowers, 23(27.71%) groups have attended diploma; 3(3.61%) TVET; 
and 2(2.41%) first degree and above. Of the remaining groupborrowers,19(22.89%), 10(12.05%), 
11(13.25%), 7(8.43%), 8(9.64%) were within the education category of illiterate, 1-4, 5-8, 9-10, 11-12, 
respectively. 
 Group borrowers in the age category of 18 to 30; 31 to 40; 41 to 55 and above 55 accounts 37.35%, 
30.12%; 28.92% and 3.61%, respectively. 
 
6.2. RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
6.2.1. STATUS OF GROUP LOAN REPAYMENT  
To know the loan repayment status, group borrowers were asked whether they have fully repay loans on time or 
not in the form of “Yes” or “No” response question. Such an objective response and direct measurement of the 
binary dependent variable (i.e., group loan repayment performance equal to “1” if groups were non-defaulters 
and “0” otherwise) was used to determine the factors that affect group loan repayment performance in a similar 
studies of Kangaroo et al. (2013), Habteab et al. (2004), and Bassem (2008).Therefore, both group defaulters and 
non-defaulters were taken into analysis for the identified common explanatory variables.  
Out of the total respondents, 52(63%) groups were non defaulter, i.e., they repay their loan fully on 
Category  Number  Percept  
sex    
Male group 35 42.17     
Female group 48 57.83        
Total 83 100 
Education level    
Illiterate 19   22.89        
1-4 10 12.05        
5-8  11 13.25        
9-10 7 8.43        
11-12 8 9.64        
TVET 3 3.61        
Diploma 23 27.71        
First degree and above 2 2.41 
Total 83 100 
Age    
18 to 30 31 37.35 
31 to 40 25 30.12 
41 to 55 24 28.92 
55+ 3 3.61 
Total  83 100 
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time, and the remaining 31(37%) group respondents were defaulter (Figure 2). As it was discussed in the 
literature, the problem of loan default reduces the lending capacity of microfinance institutions and it may also 
deny new applicants access to credit as the bank's cash flow management problems increase in a direct 
proportion to the increasing default problem (Godquin, 2004). Regarding this matter, annual reports of DECSI 
indicated that the loan default rate for DECSI is increasing from time to time (i.e., 21 %, 27 %t, 53 %, 68 % and 
57 % in 2009, 2010, 2011,2012 and 2013 and 17%, 20%, 47%, 58% and 57% in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 and 
2013) in both the south and north sub branches, respectively, particularly in the group lending (DECSI, 2014). 
This result also found 37% default. Therefore, this high loan default rate might adversely affect the financial 
sustainability of DECSI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.2. CHI-SQUARE RESULTS, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this section, the association of the dependent variable against the explanatory variables is examined by using 
the chi-square test. Thus, the results are analyzed and discussed as follows below. 
6.2.2.1. LOAN REPAYMENT AND PERSONAL CHARACTERSTICS 
Among the personal characteristics, only “sex” of borrowers is considered for analysis. The respondents are 
representative of the male as well as female group borrowers. Thus, personal characteristics of representatives 
such as age and education were ignored for analysis because the representatives’ characteristics other than sex do 
not represent the group members. The description of sex provided below indicated the association of sex (female 
and male groups) with defaulters and non-defaulters of group borrowers in terms of loan repayment performance. 
Thus, Table 5 below shows the association of loan repayment performance with sex.  
 
Table 5: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Sex 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
As Table 5 above shows, the sample was composed of both male and female group borrowers. Of the 
total sample groups 35(42.17%) were male groups and 48(57.83%) were female groups. About 14(45.16%) male 
groups and 17(54.84%) female groups were defaulters, while 21(40.38%) and 31(59.62%) of non-defaulters 
were male and female groups, respectively.  
In this study, it is hypothesized that female borrowers have positive effect on repayment performance 
than male borrowers. However, the Chi-square statistics analysis (Chi
2
 (1) = 0.1817, Pr = 0.670) shows there is 
Sex Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
Female 17 31 48 
% 54.84 59.62 57.83 
Male 14 21 35 
% 45.16 40.38 42.17 
Total 31 52 83 
% 37.35 62.65 100.00 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Pearson chi2(1) =   0.1817   Pr = 0.670 
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no statistically significant association between group loan repayment performance and sex. This result is in 
contrast to the empirical evidences which stated that female borrowers are better payers than male borrowers, 
taking into consideration their being more entrepreneurial, social ties and family responsibilities (Feroze et al., 
2011; Kangogo et al., 2013). 
6.2.2.2. LOAN REPAYMENT AND ECONOMIC FACTOR 
The following Table 6 shows the association of loan repayment performance with other source of credit (i.e., an 
economic factor).  
Table 6: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Other Source of Credit 
Other source of credit Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
Yes 9 21 30  
% 29.03 40.38 36.14  
No 22 31 53  
% 70.97 59.62 63.86  
     Total 31 52 83  
% 37.35 62.65 100.00  
% 100.00 100.00 100.00  
Pearson chi2(1) =   1.0845   Pr = 0.298 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
As Table 6 above shows, out of the total sample respondents 30(36.14%) of borrowers have responded 
that they had other source of credit and 53(63.86%) borrowers have responded that they had no other source of 
credit. About 9(29.03%) defaulter group borrowers and 21(40.38%) of the non-defaulters group borrowers had 
other source of credit.  
In this study, it is hypothesized that where group members have other sources of credit, it has negative 
effect on the probability of loan repayment performance. However, the Chi-square statistics analysis (Pearson 
chi
2
 (1) = 1.0845, Pr = 0.298) shows no statistically significant association between group loan repayment 
performance and other source of credit. This result is in contrast to the empirical evidences which stated that 
group members who have other sources of credit may feel careless in settling their loan if they decide to take no 
more round of loan from the same source because they can get loan from the alternative sources. This result is 
also in contrast to the empirical evidences which stated that when borrowers have other sources of credit, it 
significantly has positive effect on loan repayment performance; because borrowers who have other sources of 
credit use these sources to be able to settle their loan obligation in case they want to continue borrowing from the 
same source (Matin, 1997; Samuel, 2012; Zeller, 1998). 
6.2.2.3. LOAN REPAYMENT AND GROUP CHARACTERISTICS 
Group characteristics are composed of factors related to peer monitoring, social ties, screening variables, group 
pressure, and peer support/group solidarity. The description of these variables is provided below which indicates 
the association of group characteristics with defaulters and no defaulters of group borrowers in terms of loan 
repayment performance. 
PEER MONITORING 
The following Table 7 shows the association of loan repayment performance with group members knows for 
what purpose the other members have used the loan. 
Table 7: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Loan Purpose 
Loan purpose  Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
   Yes 17 44 61 
                        % 54.84 84.62 73.49 
    No 14 8 22 
                        % 45.16 15.38 26.51 
    Total 31 52 83 
                        % 37.35 62.65 100.00 
                        % 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Pearson chi2(1) =   8.8398   Pr = 0.003* 
*Significant at 1 percent level 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
As Table 7 above shows, out of the total respondents, 61(73.49%) groups knew for what purpose the 
group members have used the loan and 22(26.51%) groups did not know for what purpose the group members 
have used the loan. About 17(54.84%) defaulter group members and 44(84.62%) non-defaulter group members 
knew for what purpose the members have used the loan.  
In this study, it is hypothesized that the group members know for what purpose the other members 
have used the loan positively affect the probability of loan repayment performance. Furthermore, the Chi-square 
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analysis (Pearson chi
2
(1) = 8.8398, Pr = 0.003) shows that there is a significant association between group loan 
repayment performance and group members know for what purpose the other members have used the loan at 1 
percent significance level.  
Group members know for what purpose the other members have used the loan is a proxy for peer-
monitoring. If the group members know for what purpose the other members have used the loan helps the group 
members follow the other members to use the loan on productive activities that generate more income and helps 
repay their loan. Group members may use all or part of their loan for consumption or nonproductive activities 
that create problem on repaying loan. This indicates higher monitoring activities in the group that helps members 
will repay their loans in time and, therefore, the probability of loan repayment performance increases. 
This finding is in conformity with the empirical evidence which stated that credit diverted to non-
productive uses have a negative impact on repayment performance or increase credit default (Samuel, 2012). 
Consequently, it is possible to say that existence of group members know for what purpose the other 
members have used the loan proves to be positive and meaningfully contribute to improve the group loan 
repayment performance. 
The following Table 8 shows the association of loan repayment performance with group members 
know the monthly sales of the group members. 
Table 8: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Monthly Sales 
Know monthly sales Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
    Yes 4 19 23  
% 12.90 36.54 27.71  
    No 27 33 60  
% 87.10 63.46 72.29  
   Total 31 52 83  
 37.35 62.65 100.00  
 100.00 100.00 100.00  
          Pearson chi2(1) =   5.4161   Pr = 0.020
** 
**Significant at 5 percent level 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
As Table 8 above shows, 23 (27.71 %) group members knew the monthly sales of the other group 
members and 60(72.29%) group members did not know the monthly sales of the other group members. About 
4(12.90%) of the defaulter group members and 19(36.54%) of non-defaulter group members knew the monthly 
sales of the other group members. 
In this study, it is hypothesized that the group members know the monthly sales of the other group 
members positively affect the probability of loan repayment performance. The Chi-square analysis (Pearson 
chi
2
(1) = 5.4161, Pr = 0.020) shows that there is significant association between group loan repayment 
performance and group members know the monthly sales of the other group members at 5 percent significance 
level.  
The variable “group members know monthly sales of the other group members” is a proxy for peer-
monitoring which indicates higher monitoring activities in the group. If group members know the monthly sales 
of the other group members, it helps group members to have information about members’ monthly income. Such 
information may help group members to enforce repayment in case a group member fails to pay her/his 
obligations or help group members face difficulty of repayment. Therefore, this increases the probability of 
higher repayment performance of the group. Moreover, this result is in agreement with the empirical evidences 
which stated that the knowledge one member has of the weekly sales of other members is positively related to 
repayment performance (Habteab et al., 2004; Wydick, 1999). 
The following Table 9 shows the association of loan repayment performance with the presence of an 
internal rules and regulations. 
Table 9: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Internal Rules and Regulation 
Rules &Regulation Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
       Yes 29 49 78  
% 93.55 94.23 93.98  
        No 2 3 5  
% 6.45 5.77 6.02  
     Total 31 52 83  
 37.35 62.65 100.00  
 100.00 100.00 100.00  
Pearson chi2(1) =   0.0160   Pr = 0.899 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
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The presence of an internal rules and regulation is another proxy for peer-monitoring which help the 
members fulfill their obligations on time by having rules like penalty imposed if member defaults. As Table 9 
above indicates, out of the total sample respondents, 78(93.98%) groups had an internal rules and regulation and 
5(6.02%) groups had not rules and regulation on how to run the group. About 29(93.55%) of the defaulters 
groups and 49 (94.23%) of non-defaulter groups had rules and regulation. 
In this study, it is hypothesized that the group members have internal rules and regulations positively 
affect the probability of loan repayment performance. Even though the majority of groups have rules and 
regulation, the Chi-square analysis (Pearson chi
2
 (1) = 0.0160, Pr = 0.899) shows that there is no significant 
association between group loan repayment performance and the presence of an internal rules and regulation. This 
result is in contrary to the empirical evidence of Zeller (1996) and Bassem (2008) which stated that the existence 
of rules and regulations in a group helps force defaulting borrowers to repay on time and increase the probability 
of loan repayment performance. 
Though most of the groups have internal rule and regulation, from the above result, it is possible to 
conclude that the presence of an internal rule and regulation in a group has not effect on probability of repaying 
loan successfully, this is may be due to the group may not exercise the rules and regulation properly. 
The following Table 10 indicates the association of loan repayment performance and group members’ 
regularly visits other group members. Out of the total sample respondents 62(74.70%) group members regularly 
visited other group members and 21(25.30%) group members did not visit other group members. About 
19(61.29%) of the defaulter group members and 43(82.69%) non-defaulter group members regularly visited 
other group members.  
In this study, it is hypothesized that the group members regularly visit other group members positively 
affect the probability of loan repayment performance. Moreover, the Chi-square analysis (Pearson chi
2
(1) = 
4.7070, Pr = 0.030) shows that there is significant association between group loan repayment performance and 
group members regularly visits other group members at 5 percent significance level. 
The variable group members regularly visits other group members is another monitoring variable, 
which indicates higher monitoring activities in the group. Since the more group members visits other group 
members, the higher is the opportunity to have information of each other, which may help the group takes 
corrective measures to reduce repayment problem of individual group members and, therefore, increases loan 
repayment performance. This result is similar to the findings of Feroze et al. (2011) and Al-Azzam and Sudipta 
(2007) which stated that regular visit among group members reduce loan delinquency rate. 
From this result, it can be summarized that group members’ regularly visits other group members have 
positive effect on loan repayment performance as expected. This is may be because group members have the 
chance of higher monitoring activities in the group which increases the loan repayment performance of the group. 
Table 10: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Group Members Regularly Visits 
Members visits group members Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
       Yes 19 43 62  
% 61.29 82.69 74.70  
        No 12 9 21  
% 38.71 17.31 25.30  
     Total 31 52 83  
% 37.35 62.65 100.00  
 100.00 100.00 100.00  
Pearson chi2(1) =   4.7070   Pr = 0.030** 
**Significant at 5 percent level 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
 
PEER SUPPORT  
The following Table 11 shows the association of loan repayment performance and group members’ help. 
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Table 11: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Group Members’ Help 
Group help Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
       Yes 8 24 32  
% 25.81 46.15 38.55  
        No 23 28 51  
% 74.19 53.85 61.45  
     Total 31 52 83  
% 37.35 62.65 100.00  
% 100.00 100.00 100.00  
          Pearson chi2(1) =   3.3942   Pr = 0.065*** 
***Significant at 10 percent level 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
Group members’ help one another in times of need indicate the existence of peer support in the group. 
As Table 11 above reported, out of the total sample respondents, 32(38.55%) group members helped one another 
in times of need and 51(61.45%) members did not help one another in times of need. About 8(25.81%) of the 
defaulter group and 24(46.15%) of the non-defaulter group members helped one another in times of need.  
In this study, it is expected that the existence of group members help one another positively affects the 
probability of repayment performance. Moreover, the Chi-square analysis (Pearson chi
2
(1) = 3.3942,Pr = 0.065) 
shows that there is significant association between group loan repayment performance and group help at 10 
percent significance level.  
Group members’ help one another in times of need indicates the existence of peer support for group 
member/members who has/have problem not to repay on time and, therefore, the probability of loan repayment 
performance increases. This result is similar to the empirical evidence of Matta (2004) who found that loan 
repayment performance was increased by group help. But, it is in contrast to the findings of Feroze et al. (2011) 
which stated that peer support was insignificant. 
Therefore, it is possible to say that the existence of help among group members at the times of need or 
difficulty proves to be positive and meaningfully contribute to improve the group loan repayment performance. 
 
SCREENING VARIABLE 
The following Table 12 indicates the association of loan repayment performance and group rejected a borrower 
who would like to join the group. The variable group has rejected borrowers who would like to join the group 
indicates screening activities in the group before the group was formed since group members may have rejected 
non creditworthy borrowers. As Table 12 below indicates, out of the total sample respondents, 24(28.92%) of 
groups have rejected borrowers who would like to join the group and 59(71.08%) of groups have not rejected 
borrowers who would like to join the group. About 8(25.81%) of the defaulter groups and 16(30.77%) of non-
defaulter groups have rejected borrowers who would like to join the group.  
In this study, the variable group has rejected borrowers who would like to join the group is expected to 
have a positive effect on the probability of repayment performance. However, the Chi-square analysis (Pearson 
chi
2
 (1) = 0.2327, Pr = 0.630) shows that there is no significant association between group loan repayment 
performance and screening variable, i.e., group rejected a borrower who would like to join the group.  
This result is in contrast with the empirical finding of Bassem (2008) who stated that the good choice 
of borrowers appears as the key for success of the loan repayment and the variable the group rejects a borrower 
who wants to join it (selection) conformed its positive impact in the improvement of the group repayment 
performance. Besides, the empirical study of Zeller (1998) confirms with Bassem (2008) who supports the 
positive role of the selection on the repayment performance. And this is also in contrast with the empirical 
evidence of Al-Azzam and Sudipta (2007) which stated that loan delinquency is reduced by screening. 
Therefore, the insignificant association between group screening and loan repayment performance may 
imply negligence in selecting creditworthy borrowers due to fear of conflicts and its negative social 
consequences; for the fact that the group members are from the same Kebele or they may not have detailed 
information about each other though they are from the same Kebele.   
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Table 12: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Group Screening 
Group reject Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
     Yes 8 16 24 
% 25.81 30.77 28.92 
     No 23 36 59 
% 74.19 69.23 71.08 
   Total 31 52 83 
% 37.35 62.65 100.00 
% 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Pearson chi2(1) =   0.2327   Pr = 0.630 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
 
SOCIAL TIES  
The following Table 13 shows the association of loan repayment performance and group members knew the 
other group members before the group was formed. 
Table 13: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Group Social Tie 
Group member knew before the group was 
formed 
Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
       Yes 20 42 62  
% 64.52 80.77 74.70  
        No 11 10 21  
% 35.48 19.23 25.30  
     Total 31 52 83  
% 37.35 62.65 100.00  
% 100.00 100.00 100.00  
Pearson chi2(1) =   2.7146   Pr = 0.099*** 
***Significant at 10 percent level 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
The variable members knew the other group members before the group was formed is a proxy for 
social ties that indicates the existence of social ties among group members and such information may help group 
members to screen and monitor each other’s behavior before group formation and to use social sanctions against 
delaying members, which helps to mitigate repayment problems.  
As Table 13 above reported, out of the total sample respondents, 62(74.70%) group members knew the 
other group members before the group was formed and 21(25.30%) group members did not know the other 
group members before the group was formed. About 20(64.52%) of the defaulter group members and 42(80.77%) 
of non-defaulter group members knew the other group members before the group was formed.  
Group members knew the other group member before the group was formed is expected to have a 
positive effect on the probability of repayment performance. Furthermore, the Chi-square analysis (Pearson 
chi
2
(1) = 2.7146,Pr = 0.099) shows that there is significant association between group loan repayment 
performance and group members knew the other group members before the group was formed at 10 percent 
significance level.  
This result is similar to the findings of Al-Azzam and Sudipta (2007) and Zeller (1996) who found that 
social ties reduce the probability of loan delinquency (loan repayment problem).But, it is in contrast with the 
empirical evidence of Habteab et al. (2004) who found that social ties are statistically insignificant in loan 
repayment performance.  
Generally, from this result, it can be summarized that group members knew the other group members 
before the group was formed has positive impact on group loan repayment performance. This is may be due to 
the fact that having adequate information about the borrower help group members to screen and monitor each 
other’s behavior before group formation and helps to mitigate repayment problems. 
The following Table 14 shows the association of loan repayment performance and group members’ 
place of born. Members’ place of born is a proxy for social ties. The more group members same place of born, 
the stronger social ties among group members and help group members to screen and monitor each other’s 
behavior before group formation and to use social sanctions against delaying members, which helps to mitigate 
repayment problems.  
As Table 14 below reveals, out of the total sample respondents, 58(69.88%) group members were born 
in the same area (Mekelle) and the remaining 25 (30.12%) group members have been in Mekelle for greater than 
ten years. About 24(77.42%) of the defaulter group members and 34(65.38%) of non-defaulter group members 
were born in the same area (Mekelle).  
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Group members’ same place of born is expected to have a positive effect on the probability of 
repayment performance. Even though majority of the group members born in the same place, the Chi-square 
analysis (Pearson chi
2
 (1) =1.3364, Pr = 0.248) shows no statistically significant association between loan 
repayment performance and members place of born. It is inconsistent with the study result of Hermes et al. (2005) 
who found that group members from the same place or short physical distance among members help to reduce 
misuse of loans by individual group members and improve loan repayment performance. It is also inconsistent 
with the empirical evidence of Zeller (1998) who found that groups with stronger social ties show higher 
repayment rates. 
From this result, it can be summarized that the relationship between group loan repayment 
performance and group members’ place of born have no effect on the probability of increasing loan repayment 
performance. This might be due to the fact that people know each other very well and have close social ties may 
be less eager to pressure for repayment, for example, family or friends may be less eager to use pressure for fear 
of losing family or friends. 
Table 14: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Members Place of Borne 
Members place of born Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
Born in Mekelle 24 34 58  
% 77.42 65.38 69.88  
Above 10 years in Mekelle 7 18 25  
% 22.58 34.62 30.12  
          Total 31 52 83  
% 37.35 62.65 100.00  
 100.00 100.00 100.00  
          Pearson chi2(1) =   1.3364   Pr = 0.248 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
The following Table 15 shows the association of loan repayment performance and group members 
have been a member of another group. 
Table 15: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Member of Another Group 
Member of another group Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
Yes 7 20 27  
% 22.58 38.46 32.53  
No 24 32 56  
% 77.42 61.54 67.47  
     Total 31 52 83  
% 37.35 62.65 100.00  
% 100.00 100.00 100.00  
Pearson chi2(1) =   2.2317   Pr = 0.135 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
Being member of another group is another proxy for social tie. If group members have been a member 
of another group, it increase social ties among group members and help group members to screen and monitor 
each other’s behavior before group formation and to use social sanctions against delaying members, which helps 
to mitigate repayment problems. Based on the above Table 15, out of the total sample respondents, 27(32.53%) 
group members were member of another group and the remaining 56(67.47%) group members were not member 
of another group. About 7(22.58%) of the defaulters group members and 20(38.46%) of non-defaulters group 
members were member of another group. 
Group members have been a member of another group is expected to have a positive effect on the 
probability of repayment performance. However, the Chi-square analysis (Pearson chi
2
 (1) = 2.2317, Pr = 0.135) 
shows that no statistically significant association between loan repayment performance and group members have 
been a member of another group. This result is in contrast to the findings of Habteab et al. (2004) who found that 
group contains one or more people who have been a member of another group has statistically insignificant 
effect on loan repayment problem. 
This implies that the group may not analyze (scan) past performance of the borrowers while screening 
credit worthy member which helps to mitigate loan repayment problems. 
 
PEER-PRESSURE 
The following Table 16 shows the association of loan repayment performance and group members put pressure 
on other members to repay. In this study, it is hypothesized that peer pressure positively affects the probability of 
repayment performance. Peer pressure exercised by group members on the defaulting member/members helps in 
alleviating moral hazard behavior of the borrowers, reduces the number of days of later repayment, and improves 
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the group repayment performance. 
As indicated in the Table 16 below, out of the total sample respondents, 58(69.88%) group members 
reported that they applied pressure on defaulting group members and the remaining 25(30.12%) group members 
did not put any pressure on defaulting group members. About 12 (38.71%) of the defaulter group members and 
46 (88.46%) of non-defaulter group members put pressure on defaulting members.  
The Chi-square analysis (Pearson chi
2
 (1) = 22.8399, Pr = 0.000) shows that there is statistically 
significant association between loan repayment performance and peer pressure at 1 percent significance level. 
This result is supported by the empirical findings of Al-Azzam and Sudipta (2007), Bassem (2008) and Kangogo 
et al. (2013), who found that peer pressure on defaulting members is statistically significant and reduce the 
probability of loan repayment problem. 
Table 16: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Group Pressure 
Put pressure Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
       Yes 12 46 58  
% 38.71 88.46 69.88  
        No 19 6 25  
% 61.29 11.54 30.12  
     Total 31 52 83  
% 37.35 62.65 100.00  
% 100.00 100.00 100.00  
          Pearson chi2(1) =  22.8399   Pr = 0.000* 
*Significant at 1 percent level 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
The following Table 17 shows the association of loan repayment performance and group members 
feels against defaulting members. 
It is hypothesized that as group members feel against defaulting member/members, group members 
have strong desire for repayment. As Table 17 above shows, out of the total sample respondents, 69(83.13%) 
feel very angry and 14(16.87%) feel neutral (worried) against defaulting members. About 24 (77.42%) of the 
defaulter group members and 45 (86.54%) of non-defaulter group members feel very angry against defaulting 
members. 
Table 17: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Members Feels Against Defaulting Members 
Member Feels Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
Very angry 24 45 69  
% 77.42 86.54 83.13  
Neutral(worried) 7 7 14  
% 22.58 13.46 16.87  
Total 31 52 83  
% 37.35 62.65 100.00  
% 100.00 100.00 100.00  
          Pearson chi2(2) =   1.1518   Pr = 0.283 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
Even though majority of groups feel very angry against defaulting members, the Chi-square analysis 
(Pearson chi
2
 (1) = 1.1518, Pr = 0.283) shows no statistically significant association between loan repayment 
performance and members feels against defaulting members. Habteab et al. (2004) also found that group 
members feels against defaulting members which is a proxy for peer-pressure affects the loan repayment 
performance is statistically insignificant.  
This result implies that those group members feel very angry against defaulting members may not be 
sympathetic towards the defaulting members who might result in conflict and demotivation within the group; and 
hampers the loan repayment performance.  
The following Table 18 shows the association of loan repayment performance and penalty. 
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Table 18: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Penalty 
Penalty Defaulter  Non defaulter Total 
       Yes 12 47 59  
% 38.71 90.38 71.08  
        No 19 5 24  
% 61.29 9.62 28.92  
     Total 31 52 83  
% 37.35 62.65 100.00  
% 100.00 100.00 100.00  
          Pearson chi2(1) =  25.2313   Pr = 0.000* 
*Significant at 1 percent level 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
Penalty is also another proxy for peer-pressure. It is hypothesized that as group members imposed 
penalty, it improves the probability of repayment performance. Due to fear of penalty (i.e., he/she will be denied 
subsequent loans, he/she will have to leave the group, and he/she will be reported to the credit officer) group 
members respect their contract, reduces the number of days of later repayment, and improve repayment 
performance of a group. 
As Table 18 above shows, out of the total sample respondents, 59(71.08%) groups have penalty for 
defaulting members within the group and the remaining24 (28.92%) groups did not have any penalty within the 
group. About 12 (38.71%) of the defaulter groups and 47(90.38%) of non-defaulter groups had penalty within 
the group.  
In this study, majority of groups had penalty against defaulting members. Furthermore, the Chi-square 
analysis (Pearson chi
2
 (1) = 25.2313, Pr = 0.000) shows that there is a significant association between loan 
repayment performance and penalty on defaulting members at 1 percent significance level. This finding is 
similar with the finding of Al-Azzam and Sudipta (2007), Bassem (2008) and Kangogo et al. (2013) who found 
that group penalty significantly and positively affects loan repayment performance. 
6.2.2.4. LOAN REPAYMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTOR 
The following Table 19 shows the association of loan repayment performance and loan officer visit. 
As Table 19 above shows, out of the total sample respondents, 35(42.17%) groups were visited by loan 
officer and the remaining 48 (57.83%) groups were not visited by loan officer. About 12 (38.71%) of the 
defaulter groups and 23(44.23%) of non-defaulter groups were visited by loan officer.  
Table 19: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Loan Officer Visit 
Loan officer Visit Defaulter Non defaulter Total 
       Yes 12 23 35  
% 38.71 44.23 42.17  
        No 19 29 48  
% 61.29 55.77 57.83  
     Total 31 52 83  
% 37.35 62.65 100.00  
% 100.00 100.00 100.00  
Pearson chi2(1) =   0.2428   Pr = 0.622 
Source: Own Computation (2014). 
Loan officer visit to group members indicates a continuous follow up to the group members’ proper 
utilization of loans after the loan have already distributed to individual members. Thus, it is hypothesized that 
loan officer visit helps borrowers monitor their obligations and improve proper utilization of the loan thereby 
improving repayment performance. However, the Chi-square analysis (Pearson chi
2
 (1) = 0.2428,   Pr = 0.622) 
shows that there is no significant association between loan repayment performance and loan officer visits. This 
result is in contrast to the empirical evidence of Kangogo et al. (2013) who found that loan officer visit is 
statistically significant to increase probability of loan repayment performance. 
This implies that loan officers’ visit and their monitoring and evaluation measures may not be enforced 
by the concerned higher body. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1.   CONCLUSIONS 
The repayment performance of group borrowers is one element of measuring effectiveness of the loan released 
by microfinance institutions. Repayment performance of the group borrowers is affected by several factors such 
as the group borrower’s characteristics, personal characteristic, economic factor and institutional factor. These 
factors are believed to have either positive or adverse effect on the loan repayment performance of the group 
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borrowers. Some of the factors functioned as per the prior expectation, whereas others were determined to be 
insignificant or contrary to prior expectation.  
Hence, this study was conducted to investigate the factors influencing group loan repayment 
performance in Dedebit Credit and Savings Institution (DECSI), Mekelle, Tigray. All of the 15 explanatory 
variables were analyzed by using the Chi-square test statistics. Out of which seven variables (loan purpose, 
group members know the monthly sales of the group members, group members’ regularly visits other group 
members, group members’ help, group members knew the other group members before the group was formed, 
group members put pressure on other members to repay, and penalty) were found to have statistically significant 
association with loan repayment performance and the remaining eight variables (sex, other source of credit, the 
presence of an internal rules and regulations, group rejected a borrower/s who would like to join the group, 
group members’ place of born, group members have been a member of another group, group members feels 
against defaulting members, and loan officer visit) were found to have statistically insignificant association with 
loan repayment performance.  
Based on the research findings, the following conclusions are drawn: 
 About 52(63%) groups were non defaulter, i.e., they repay their loan fully on time, and the remaining 
31(37 %) group respondents were defaulter. 
 The existence of group members know for what purpose the other members have used the loan proves 
to be positive and meaningfully contribute to improve the group loan repayment performance. This is 
due to the fact that those group members know for what purpose the other members have used the loan 
helps the group members follow the other members to use the loan on productive activities that generate 
more income and helps repay their loan on time. 
 The existence of group members know monthly sales of the other group members revealed statistically 
significant association with loan repayment performance. Group members know the monthly sales of 
the other group members are most probably repaying loan successfully as compared to defaulter groups 
and positively related to group loan repayment performance. 
 The factor group members’ regularly visits other group members have positive effect on loan 
repayment performance. This is may be because of the facts that it leads to higher levels of information 
symmetry and monitoring activities among group members, discuss their business activities and solve 
problems of group members who have repayment difficulty. 
 The existence of help among group members at the times of need or difficulty proves to be positive and 
meaningfully contribute to improve the group loan repayment performance. 
 The factor group members knew the other group members before the group were formed has positive 
impact on group loan repayment performance. This is may be due to the fact that having adequate 
information about the borrower help group members to screen and monitor each other’s behavior before 
group formation and helps to mitigate repayment problems. 
 The group members put pressure on other member/s to repay loan has a positive effect as the result 
indicated higher non default rate as compared to the defaulter groups. 
 The group borrowers who imposed penalty against defaulting members are most probably repaying loan 
successfully as compared to the defaulter groups and, hence, positively related to group loan repayment 
performance. 
 
7.2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The default rate of DECSI microfinance institution is increasing from time to time. Hence, It is important to 
consider what sorts of interventions might be considered to solve repayment problem of the sector that 
determines financial sustainability of the DECSI microfinance institution in order to increase the lending 
capacity and new applicants access to credit. Thus, based on the conclusion of the research findings, the study 
has forwarded the following recommendations: 
 DECSI should encourage to loan officers to continuously follow up and visit borrowers to evaluate the 
loan utilization, helps borrowers monitor their obligations and improve proper utilization of the loan 
and loan officers promote borrowers to better solve their repayment problems, thereby, improving 
repayment performance. 
 DECSI should also encourage by organizing either the loan officer or the head of each group to have 
enough information on monthly sales of borrowers because information on monthly sales of borrowers 
helps the group to make decision to help, pressure or impose penalty on defaulting borrower/s that 
ensures higher repayment performance and reduce willful defaulters. 
 DECSI should take a pro-active role in organizing and facilitating the group members to regularly visit 
or meet other group members and should also be mandatory and more formal nature where members 
can discuss their business activities and any problems they might be having.  
 DECSI should encourage group members to help one another when an unforeseen or uncontrollable 
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situation arises rather than feel uncomfortable (anger) with their group member/s to collect the unpaid 
loan. This could also lead to improved loan repayment performance. 
 The screening criterion should be revised and DECSI’s loan officers should have to play major role 
directly helping the group formation in screening and selection of applicants. This is because DECSI’s 
loan officers have long experience for effective screening and select creditworthy borrowers.  
 DECSI should have to play major role directly by screening applicants from same area or community 
that helps information asymmetry among group borrowers and helps to have better information to 
monitor and more easily pressure for repayment. 
 DECSI’s credit officers should have to advocate borrowers put pressure and imposed penalty against 
will full defaulting borrower/s because in this empirical study the two factors ensured higher repayment 
performance and reduce delinquency.  
 
7.3. LIMITATION AND SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
There may be several factors that influence group loan repayment performance besides the factors that are 
specified in this study which hamper ability of group borrowers to fulfill their loan repayment obligations as per 
the repayment periods contract. These factors include experience of group borrowers in the sector, group 
harmony, loan frequency, interest rate, loan amount or size, household size, personal as well as market shock, 
and dynamic incentives. In addition, addressing the group representative only for the study may affect the quality 
or reliability of the study because of biasness even if the assumption was that the representative is the one who 
can represent on behalf of all group members. 
Thus, further research should be carried out by addressing the additional factors and by using sample members 
of the group borrowers, rather than only representatives, to determine the factors influencing group loan 
repayment performance in order to provide results that can be generalized and give accurate policy 
recommendations.  
 
7.4. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The research output will be helpful for DECSI to evaluate its group lending criteria and revise it accordingly in 
favor of credit worthy borrowers so as to alleviate loan repayment constraints; and policy makers to formulate 
successful credit policies and programs that enable them to allocate scarce financial resources to the 
development of basic sectors of the economy. Besides, it contributes to the existing empirical literature on the 
area and will also be used as an input for further studies. 
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